Our perception of the sensory world is constantly modulated by the environment surrounding us and by our psychological state; each encounter with the same stimulus can in fact evoke very different perceptions. This phenomenological richness correlates well with the plasticity and the state-dependency observed in neural responses to sensory stimuli. This article reviews recent results on how the processing of sensory inputs varies depending on the internal state of the animal. Specifically it focuses on the gustatory system and on data showing that levels of attention and expectation modulate taste processing and gustatory cortical activity in meaningful ways. Mounting experimental evidence suggesting that expectation-dependent changes in gustatory cortical activity result from changes in the coupling between the amygdala and the cortex will also be discussed. The results presented here begin to paint a complex picture of taste, which goes beyond the framework of classical coding theories.
Attention to Tastes Changes Taste Perception
These well-known (if anecdotal) facts suggest that pretaste activity in the gustatory neuroaxis can have strong and specific impacts on neural coding of the tastes themselvesexpectation changes everything. A simple laboratory illustration of such changes can be found in studies performed recently in our lab (Fig. 1) . When rats involved in a tasting task suddenly lost interest in this task, the "spontaneous" patterns of activity in gustatory cortex (GC) changed drastically, such that large 10 Hz spikes appeared in prestimulus local field potentials 1 (Fig. 1A) . These sudden changes were accompanied by equally sudden modifications to the taste responses of individual GC neurons. 2 But attention doesn't simply change GC responses; it changes them in explicable, palatability-specific ways. Responses in inattentive animals emphasize major differences in palatability-pleasant versus aversive tastes-and de-emphasize finer differences within these larger categories (Fig. 1B) . As predicted by earlier work, 3 these differences are expressed purely in palatability-related portions of the neural codes, more than 0.75 s after taste delivery; earlier aspects of the taste codes are unaltered. Palatability-related orofacial behaviors 4 (taste reactivity 5 ) change in concert with these neural changes, 2 such that the differences between pleasing and aversive tastes increases and the differences within category (i.e., between two aversive tastes) decreases (Fig. 1C) .
Thus, as is true in other modalities, 6,7 taste responses are very sensitive to even as broad a manipulation as arousal. When an animal focuses on the possibility of taste administration, this focus has a reliable impact on taste perception-an impact that makes evolutionary sense, in that it is adaptive for an "inattentive" animal to remain sensitive to highly positive and negative stimuli, lest the animal fail to respond to food, mates, and threats.
Expectation of Taste Delivery Changes Taste Perception
Given that focusing attention on the taste modality changes taste perception, it should come as no surprise that specific expectation of upcoming taste delivery has even greater effects. Tastes are unique among stimuli in that they are, in nature, always self-administeredan animal seldom if ever finds a taste on the tongue unbidden. Taste self-administration travels hand in hand with taste expectation, and therefore should engender different neural responses, and a different perceptual experience, than those engendered by delivery to a passive animal.
Evidence resoundingly confirms this prediction. In fact, the difference between passive and self-administration is such that it changes the very circuit involved in taste perception. For instance, the neural system underlying conditioned taste aversion (CTA), the process whereby an animal comes to dislike the experience of consuming a taste that has previously caused illness, depends on the nature of stimulus delivery: when the taste is delivered to a passive rat through an intra-oral cannula (IOC) CTA requires basolateral amygdala, but when the animal licks the taste from a spout it does not. 8, 9 Our recent work demonstrates that CTAs are independent of amygdala even when the taste is delivered through an IOC, if the animal triggers delivery by breaking an infrared beam in a nose-poke (Wieskopf et al., submitted). Further work from our laboratory reveals an entire class of taste neurons in basolateral amygdala that respond only to "surprise" deliveries; taste responses in these neurons are largely inhibited when the animal self-administers the stimulus. 10 We are now completing an in-depth examination directly comparing passive-and self-administration in GC, amygdala, and prefrontal responses (Fontanini & Katz, in preparation) . This examination demonstrates that taste expectation-not expectation of a particular taste, but simply the anticipation that a taste will soon arrive-changes all aspects of GC taste responses. In fact, GC neurons develop entirely novel responses to stimuli that announce the availability of tastes for self-administration. These stimuli may not be gustatory; in our hands, rats learn to acquire tastes in the presence of a particular tone, and taste neurons come to respond at short latencies to this tone. Our work suggests that both the changes in taste coding and the novel, nontaste responses are related to activity in "higher" structures, as the animal organizes its cognitive, sensory, and probably motor resources into a single system for the purpose of perceiving a taste stimulus in the complete context of its current situation.
Conclusion
Of course, the purpose of this research is not to suggest that GC exists to process auditory information, or even to provide still more evidence for the already well-documented fact that sensory cortex is intrinsically multimodal.
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What our data ultimately demonstrates is that taste responses, usually argued to reflect either labeled-line 12 or across-fiber coding, 13, 14 may in fact reflect neither: both of the coding schemes debated in the taste literature assume that neural responses supply reliable, faithful reports of the taste on the tongue; the data described here suggest, in contrast, that taste responses are massively variable and sensitive to the specifics of prestimulus activity in GC and "higher" structures. As such, these data suggest, as has been suggested previously at ISOT meetings, 15 that "coding" may be a poor description of what the gustatory system does with tastes. GC activity seems too variable across contexts, and the codebook that a putative decoder would need to understand this activitythe mapping between code and meaning in every context-seems too vast for the taste responses to serve as reliable codes. Whether or not this proves to be the case, or whether instead there is some useful "core" of neurons that respond reliably regardless of context, remains to be seen. What is clear, however, is that the bulk of the taste-related activity in GC has more to do with the performance of associative tasks than with sensory coding per se.
